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The present study focuses on the multifaceted concept of self-disturbance in
schizophrenia, adding knowledge about a not yet investigated aspect, which is
the interoceptive accuracy. Starting from the assumption that interoceptive accuracy
requires an intact sense of self, which otherwise was proved to be altered in
schizophrenia, the aim of the present study was to explore interoceptive accuracy
in a group of schizophrenia patients, compared to healthy controls. Furthermore,
the possible association between interoceptive accuracy and patients’ positive and
negative symptomatology was assessed. To pursue these goals, a group of 23
schizophrenia patients and a group of 23 healthy controls performed a heartbeat
perception task. Patients’ symptomatology was assessed by means of the Positive
and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). Results demonstrated significantly lower
interoceptive accuracy in schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls. This
difference was not accounted for participants’ age, BMI, anxiety levels, and heart
rate. Furthermore, patients’ illness severity, attention and pharmacological treatment did
not influence their interoceptive accuracy levels. Interestingly, a strong positive relation
between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptoms severity, especially Grandiosity,
was found. The present results demonstrate for the first time that interoceptive accuracy
is altered in schizophrenia. Furthermore, they prove a specific association between
interoceptive accuracy and positive symptomatology, suggesting that the symptom
Grandiosity might be protective against an altered basic sense of self in patients
characterized by higher sensibility to their inner bodily sensations.
Keywords: basic self, bodily self, grandiosity, interoception, interoceptive accuracy, positive symptoms,
schizophrenia, selfhood
INTRODUCTION
“A circle is the only geometric shape defined by its centre. No chicken and egg about it, the centre came
first, the circumference follows. The earth, by definition, has a centre. And only the fool that knows it can
go wherever he pleases, knowing the centre will hold him down, stop him flying out of orbit. But when
your sense of centre shifts, comes whizzing to the surface, the balance has gone. The balance has gone. The
balance my baby has gone.”
[Sarah Kane, Crave]
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These words allow to grasp the core subjective experience of
schizophrenia, the loss of the most fundamental selfhood, which
is interchangeably named as “minimal self ”, “basic self ”, “proto-
self ”, or “ipseity” (Hur et al., 2014). Assuming selfhood as a multi-
layered concept, its most primitive, pre-reflective, and immediate
layer, which remains when all other levels are stripped away,
can be considered as the basic experience of the self (Sass and
Parnas, 2003; Fuchs, 2005). In schizophrenia it principally refers
to the loss of the basic sense of ownership and agency of one’s
own experiences, thoughts, or actions (Jaspers, 1923). Robust
empirical evidence indicates that both full-blown psychosis
(Peled et al., 2000, 2003; Thakkar et al., 2011; Ferri et al., 2013)
and psychosis proneness among non-clinical samples (Morgan
et al., 2011; Germine et al., 2013) are associated with a blurred
and extremely flexible sense of body ownership, measured by
the Rubber Hand Illusion paradigm (RHI, Botvinick and Cohen,
1998). Further studies, although not consistently (for a review
see Hur et al., 2014), demonstrated the presence of an altered
sense of agency in people suffering from schizophrenia. Indeed,
among schizophrenia patients both abnormal over-estimations
(Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010; Maeda et al., 2012) and
under-estimations (Synofzik et al., 2010; Renes et al., 2013) of the
causality between one’s own actions and the subsequent external
events were found.
Interestingly, specific relations between deficits in basic
self experiences and schizophrenia symptomatology have been
extensively demonstrated. For instance, Schneiderian first rank
symptoms (i.e., thought insertion, thought-broadcasting, somatic
passivity, delusional perception) are associated to altered sense
of ownership and agency (Fourneret et al., 2001; Jeannerod,
2009; Waters and Badcock, 2010); while weak body ownership
is associated to positive schizophrenia symptoms (Peled et al.,
2000; Thakkar et al., 2011) and anhedonia negative symptom
(Ferri et al., 2014). Furthermore, abnormal over-estimation of
individual sense of agency strongly correlates with positive
psychotic symptoms severity (Voss et al., 2010) and prevalence
(Maeda et al., 2013). Consistently, a significant under-estimation
of individual sense of agency appeared to be related with the
prevalence of negative psychotic symptoms (Maeda et al., 2013).
Another intriguing aspect of the self experience, which
recently gained a lot of attention, is interoception. It is defined
as the individual sensitivity to physiological stimuli originating
inside of the body (Craig, 2002). Interoception, far from being
considered as an unitary concept, can be quantified along
the three dimensions of: interoceptive accuracy (i.e., objective
performance at behavioral task requiring the detection of visceral
sensations); interoceptive sensibility (i.e., explicit self-assessment
of subjective interoception abilities by questionnaires) and
interoceptive awareness (i.e., metacognitive awareness obtained
by confidence-accuracy correspondence) (Garfinkel et al., 2014).
The most studied dimension is the interoceptive accuracy, which
assumes a fundamental self experience related to the implicit and
pre-reflective notion of the self. In fact, the attribution of feelings
and sensations to one’s own body presupposes an intact basic
sense of self. “No chicken and egg about it, the centre came first,
the circumference follows”: necessarily, first I implicitly feel myself,
then I can attribute internal body sensations to myself. In more
empirical terms, a link between interoceptive accuracy and basic
self experiences has to be expected. Coherently, low interoceptive
accuracy resulted associated to a greater malleability of body
sense of ownership among healthy participants (Tsakiris et al.,
2011; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; Suzuki et al., 2013). The strict
relation between interoceptive accuracy and basic self experiences
finds neuroscientific support in the fact that the most salient inner
bodily feelings, contributing to a “cinemascopic representation of
the entire body from within”, require the Insular cortex (Craig,
2003) the brain structure also involved in interoceptive processes
(Pollatos et al., 2007b; Jarrahi et al., 2015).
The recent growing interest in interoception is justified by
two reasons. First, interoceptive accuracy has been demonstrated
to play a crucial role in the modulation of numerous aspects of
cognitive and affective human life. It influences decision making
processes (Werner et al., 2009) as well as the perception and
evaluation of emotional stimuli (Pollatos et al., 2007a; Dunn
et al., 2010a). Furthermore, it also appears to be involved in
the autonomic regulation during social interactions (Ferri et al.,
2013) and in individual resilience ability (Haase et al., 2016).
Second, interoceptive accuracy appeared to be compromised
in several psychiatric disorders, such as anorexia nervosa,
major depression, depersonalization-derealization disorders, and
anxiety disorders (Pollatos et al., 2008; Furman et al., 2013;
Gaudio et al., 2014; Sedeño et al., 2014; Harshaw, 2015).
Remarkably, studies regarding the abilities to perceive
one’s own internal bodily signals in schizophrenia are still
lacking. This lacuna is particularly important for several
reasons. As described above, schizophrenia is characterized
by altered experience of the basic sense of self (i.e., body
ownership and sense of agency), which has been proved to be
related to interoception in healthy participants. Furthermore,
the unusual bodily and visceral sensations included in the
“coenaesthesic” schizophrenia symptoms (Parnas et al., 2005b;
Vollmer-Larsen et al., 2007) (e.g., migrating inner sensations
wandering through the body, electric, or thermal feelings,
abnormal sense of pulling/pressure or heaviness/emptiness inside
of the body, and dysesthetic crises involving the vegetative
system) suggest a severe impairment in the patients’ sensitivity
to internal bodily signals. Finally, schizophrenia patients show
anatomical and functional alterations in the Insular cortex
(Kasai et al., 2003; Wylie and Tregellas, 2010; Ebisch et al.,
2011, 2013, 2014), which possibly accounts for a large
variety of symptoms encompassing affect and pain processing,
hallucination (especially visceral hallucinations) (Kathirvel and
Mortimer, 2013), self-perception and also visceral abnormal
sensations.
All this evidence taken together, in addition to the huge
impact of interoceptive accuracy on fundamental cognitive
and affective aspects of human life, makes the investigation
of interoceptive accuracy in schizophrenia and its potential
influence on symptomatology of crucial relevance.
In the present study, interoceptive accuracy was estimated in
a group of schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls.
Furthermore, the possible relation between individual intero-
ceptive accuracy and positive and negative symptomatology
was assessed. To these goals, all the participants performed
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a heartbeat perception task (Schandry, 1981). Furthermore,
schizophrenia patients completed a clinical evaluation
of their symptomatology by means of the Positive and
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay et al., 1987). The
heartbeat perception task was chosen instead of the heartbeat
discrimination task – a different technique to assess individual
interoceptive accuracy (Brener and Kluvitse, 1988) – because,
whereas in the execution of the heartbeat perception task
attention is directly focused only on inner bodily signals (i.e.,
heartbeats), in the heartbeat discrimination task participants
are required to integrate internal and external signals (i.e.,
heartbeats and sounds) to give a synchrony judgment. Given
the multisensory integration deficits frequently described in
schizophrenia patients (for a review see Tseng et al., 2015), we
wanted to rule out any possible confounding effect of these
deficits on the assessment of participants’ interoceptive abilities.
Drawing from the prior studies, here briefly revised, we
expected to find significantly lower interoceptive accuracy
in schizophrenia patients, with respect to healthy controls.
Moreover, due to the novelty of the issue a specific relation
between interoceptive accuracy and patients’ symptomatology
was assessed in an explorative way.
TABLE 1 | Demographic information about Schizophrenia patients (SCZ) and healthy controls (HC).
SCZ HC
n. 23 23
Age (mean ± SD) 33.78 ± 6.33 31.91 ± 9.18
Male sex, (n◦ – %) 17–73.91 20–86.96
Right handedness, (n◦ – %) 20–86.96 21–91.30
Body Mass Index (BMI), Kg/m2 (mean ± SD) 24.31 ± 2.31 23.27 ± 2.54
Heart Rate (HR), bpm (mean ± SD) 86.48 ± 16.21 76.72 ± 15.59
Diagnosis
Schizophrenia paranoid subtype, (n◦ – %) 20–86.95 n.a.
Schizoaffective disorder, (n◦ – %) 3–13 n.a.
Illness duration, year (mean ± SD) 9.22 ± 3.61 n.a.
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II disorders (SCID-II)
Cluster A, (n◦ – %) 2–8.69 n.a.
Cluster B, (n◦ – %) 2–8.69 n.a.
Cluster C, (n◦ – %) 2–8.69 n.a.
Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF) (mean ± SD) 46.70 ± 7.60 n.a.
Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R) total score (mean ± SD) n.a. 49.44 ± 9.05
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale for Schizophrenia (PANSS)
Positive Scale (P) (mean ± SD) 22.17 ± 8.16 n.a.
Prevalence of Positive symptoms (n◦ – %) 10–43.48 n.a.
Delusions (mean ± SD) 3.65 ± 1,70 n.a.
Conceptual disorganization (mean ± SD) 2.78 ± 1.28 n.a.
Hallucinatory behavior (mean ± SD) 2.74 ± 1.54 n.a.
Excitement (mean ± SD) 3.00 ± 1.62 n.a.
Grandiosity (mean ± SD) 3.09 ± 1.70 n.a.
Suspiciousness/persecution (mean ± SD) 3.87 ± 1.58 n.a.
Hostility (mean ± SD) 3.04 ± 1.64 n.a.
Negative Scale (N) (mean ± SD) 25.74 ± 7.65 n.a.
Prevalence of Negative symptoms (n◦ – %) 13–56.52 n.a.
General Psychopathology Scale (G) (mean ± SD) 53.39 ± 12.42 n.a.
Composite Scale (mean ± SD) −3.57 ± 10.45 n.a.
Total (mean ± SD) 101.30 ± 22.38 n.a.
State Anxiety Inventory (STAI-I) (mean ± SD) 47.23 ± 14.95 34.43 ± 7.49 ∗
Chlorpromazine Equivalent, mg/die (mean ± SD) 389.77 ± 762.35 n.a.
Intelligent Quotient (mean ± SD) 101.83 ± 13.10 n.a.
Atypical antipsychotic
Risperidone, (n◦ – %) 3–13.04 n.a.
Olanzapine, (n◦ – %) 7–30.43 n.a.
Quetiapine, (n◦ – %) 1–4.34 n.a.
Ziprasidone, (n◦ – %) 1–4.34 n.a.
Aripiprazole, (n◦ – %) 4–17.39 n.a.
Numbers may not add to total due to missing data or rounding. n.a., not available; ∗p < 0.05.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-three schizophrenia patients (SCZ; 17 males, mean
age 33.78 years ± 6.33) and 23 healthy controls (HC; 20
males; mean age 31.91 years ± 9.18) were included in the
present study. SCZ participants were recruited from outpatient
services at Perugia Mental Health Department and diagnosed
according to the structured clinical interview for DSM-IV. The
mean illness duration was 9.22 ± 3.61 months. Only SCZ
participants treated with atypical antipsychotic were included
in the study. Due to the large variety of atypical antipsychotics
frequently used in the treatment of schizophrenia, an estimation
of evidence-based and consistent therapeutic dose equivalence
across these medications is needed to directly compare patients’
exposed to different drugs, with different dosages and for
different times. For this reason, Chlorpromazine equivalents
were calculated following standard practices for antipsychotics
(Woods, 2003). Exclusion criteria for all participants comprised
significant medical, cardiac or neurological illnesses, substance
abuse or dependence in the previous 6 months and mental
retardation (IQ < 70). Solely for the HC participants either
a personal history of Axis I/II disorders or a history of
psychosis in first-degree relatives were considered as exclusion
criteria.
All participants filled an anamnestic questionnaire through
which their demographic and medical information was obtained.
SCZ participants were further evaluated by structured clinical
interviews for DSM-IV Axis I (SCID-I) and Axis II (SCID-
II) disorders (First et al., 1996, 2012). They were rated for
positive and negative symptoms severity using the PANSS
for Schizophrenia (including Positive, Negative, and General
Psychopathology scales) (Kay et al., 1987) and for their social
functioning through the Global Assessment of Functioning
scale (GAF) (Hall, 1995). Patients’ intelligence quotient (IQ)
was evaluated by means of the Raven Standard Progressive
Matrices (SPM) (Raven et al., 1998a,b). Healthy controls’
psychopathological symptoms were evaluated by means of
the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R) (Derogatis and
Savitz, 2000). Finally, to control for individual differences in
anxiety at the time of the experiment, all participants filled
the State Anxiety Inventory (STAI-I) (Pedrabissi and Santinello,
1989).
See Table 1 for a detailed description of participants’
information.
Procedure
This study was approved by the Bioethics Committee of Perugia
University. Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants after full explanation of the study procedure, in line
with the Declaration of Helsinki 2013.
To avoid potential influences on participants’ heart rate, the
assumption of alcohol, caffeine, and tobacco for 2 h prior to
the experiment was forbidden to all participants. On arrival,
participants filled the self-report questionnaires (i.e., anamnestic
questionnaire, SCL-90-R, STAI-I). Before this session, SCZ
participants completed the clinical assessment (i.e., DSM-IV
interviews, PANSS, GAF, and SPM) at the outpatient service of
the Perugia Mental Health Department.
Interoceptive accuracy was measured using the heartbeat
perception task (Schandry, 1981; Garfinkel et al., 2014) that
has good test–retest reliability (up to 0.81) (Tsakiris et al.,
2011) and highly correlates with other detection tasks (Knoll
and Hodapp, 1992). Without taking advantage from biological
feedback (e.g., by taking their wrist pulse), participants were
instructed to silently count their own heartbeats following an
audiovisual “start” signal until they received an audiovisual “stop”
signal. “Start” and “stop” signals individuated four different
time intervals of 100, 45, 35, and 25 s, presented in random
order across participants. A brief training session (15 s) was
arranged before the actual experiment intervals. At each “stop”
signal participants were asked to orally communicate to the
experimenter the number of heartbeats counted during the just
completed time interval. Both the length of the intervals and the
quality of task performance were never revealed to participants.
During the entire procedure, electrocardiogram (ECG) was
recorded using three 10 mm Ag/AgCl pre-gelled electrodes
(ADInstruments, UK) attached to the participants’ wrists
and left ankle following the ordinary Einthoven’s triangle
configuration. Before the execution of the heartbeat perception
task, participants’ ECG was recorded for 2 additional minutes in
a rest condition to collect participants’ baseline heart rate.
Interoceptive accuracy was then calculated, following standard
procedure (Schandry, 1981; Garfinkel et al., 2014), as the mean
score of four heartbeat perception intervals according to the
following formula:
1/46(1− (|recorded heartbeats − counted heartbeats|)/
recorded heartbeats).
Consequently, interoceptive accuracy values vary between
0 and 1, with higher scores indicating small differences
between recorded and counted heartbeats and therefore greater
interoceptive accuracy.
RESULTS
Between-groups Differences in Age,
Body Mass Index, STAI-I Score, and
Heart Rate
In order to verify between-groups differences in participants’
age, Body Mass Index (BMI), STAI-I score and heart rate (HR)
possibly influencing participants’ interoceptive accuracy (Jones,
1995; Khalsa et al., 2009; Pollatos et al., 2009), four independent
sample t-tests (two-tailed) were performed comparing SCZ and
HC participants. Results demonstrated a significant difference
between SCZ and HC for STAI-I score (SCZ: 47.23, SE 3.19; HC:
34.04, SE 1.46; t43 = 3.814, p = 0.001) and HR (SCZ: 86.48 BPM
SE 16.21; HC: 76.72 BPM, SE 3.25; t44 = 2.083, p = 0.043). No
significant difference was found for age (t44 = 0.748, p = 0.459)
and BMI (t44 = 1.465, p= 0.15).
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FIGURE 1 | Interoceptive accuracy marginal means for SCZ and HC
participants. Covariates included in the model were estimated equal to the
following values: age = 32.7778; BMI = 23.8401; STAI-I score = 40.6889;
HR = 81.4887 SCZ: Schizophrenia patients; HC: Healthy controls. Error bars
represent SE. ∗p < 0.05.
Between-Groups Difference in
Interoceptive Accuracy
To pursue the first goal of the present study, between-
groups difference in interoceptive accuracy, controlling for age,
BMI, STAI-I score, and HR, was assessed by an ANCOVA
analysis. Group (SCZ, HC) was entered as between-factor,
whereas age, BMI, STAI-I score, and HR were included in
the model as covariates. The Levene’s test was not significant
[F(1,43) = 1,558, p = 0.219], revealing that the homogeneity
of variance assumption was not violated. Results demonstrated
that SCZ showed a significant lower interoceptive accuracy than
HC (SCZ: 0.366, SE 0.063; HC: 0.579, SE 0.62; F(1,39) = 4.355,
p= 0.043, µ2p = 0.10) (Figure 1). None of the covariates included
in the model resulted significant [age: F(1,39) = 3.183, p = 0.082,
µ2p = 0.07; BMI: F(1,39) = 0.211, p = 0.649, µ2p = 0.01; STAI-I
score: F(1,39) = 0.008, p = 0.928, µ2p = 0.01; HR: F(1,39) = 0.777,
p= 0.383].
Impact of SCZ Participants’ Illness
Severity, Attention, and Pharmacological
Treatment on Interoceptive Accuracy
Illness duration (computed in years from the first psychotic
episode), number of hospital admissions and SCZ participants’
score obtained to GAF scale were used as indexes of
illness severity. In order to assess the possible influence of
illness severity on SCZ participants’ interoceptive accuracy
three linear regression analyses were computed including
years from the first psychotic event, number of hospital
admissions and GAF score as predictors. Similarly, possible
attention deficit could interfere with patients’ performance
in heartbeat perception task preventing the needed focus on
internal bodily signals. For this reason another linear regression
analysis was conducted on patients’ interoceptive accuracy
using the score obtained at Poor Attention item of PANSS
as predictor (G11 score of PANSS). Finally, the possible role
of pharmacological treatment (measured by Chlorpromazine
equivalents; Woods, 2003) on SCZ participants’ interoceptive
accuracy was investigated performing a further linear regression
analysis in which Chlorpromazine equivalents was treated as a
predictor. Results demonstrated the absence of any significant
effect of both illness severity [illness duration: R2 = 0.166;
F(1,17) = 3.188; p = 0.093; β = 0.408; number of hospital
admissions: R2 = 0.044; F(1,22) = 0.977; p = 0.334; GAF
score: R2 = 0.156; F(1,22) = 3.877; p = 0.062]; attention
[R2 = 0.054; F(1,22) = 1.204; p = 0.285; β = 0.233],
and pharmacological treatment [R2 = 0.037; F(1,15) = 0.532;
p = 0.478; β = 0.191] on SCZ participants’ interoceptive
accuracy.
Relation between Interoceptive
Accuracy and Schizophrenia Symptoms
Pearsons’ correlation analyses were conducted to pursue the
second goal of this study, thus evaluating the relation between
interoceptive accuracy and positive or negative symptomatology
among SCZ participants. Bonferroni-corrected (p < 0.025)
correlation analyses demonstrated a significant relation between
SCZ participants’ interoceptive accuracy and the score obtained
with the Positive PANSS scale (r23 = 0.483; p= 0.020) (Figure 2).
Conversely, SCZ participants’ interoceptive accuracy was not
related to the score obtained with the Negative PANSS scale
(r23 = 0.132; p= 0.547).
To better explore the significant relation between
interoceptive accuracy and SCZ participants’ positive symptoms
and hence to evaluate which of the seven different positive
symptoms showed the strongest relation with SCZ participants’
interoceptive accuracy, Bonferroni-corrected (p < 0.007)
correlation analyses were calculated for the seven items
of the Positive PANSS scale (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7).
SCZ participants’ P5-Grandiosity was the only item of the
Positive PANSS scale turned out to have a near Bonferroni-
corrected significant linear relation with interoceptive accuracy
(r23 = 0.531; p = 0.009) (Figure 3). See Table 2 for the Pearsons’
correlation coefficients and p values obtained for the all seven
items of Positive PANSS scale.
In order to substantiate the relevance of P5-Grandiosity in
the relation between interoceptive accuracy and SCZ participants’
positive symptoms, a partial correlation analysis was performed.
Partial correlation analysis allows the study of the linear
relationship between two variables after excluding the effect of
one or more factors.
Thus, if the relation between SCZ participants’ interoceptive
accuracy and the score at Positive PANSS scale obtained by
the sum of the six items with the exclusion of P5-Grandiosity,
results not significant when controlling for the score at P5-
Grandiosity, it is reasonable to conclude that P5-Grandiosity
is a relevant positive symptom mediating the tested linear
relation between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptoms.
On the contrary, if the linear relation between interoceptive
accuracy and the positive symptoms (with the exclusion of
P5-Grandiosity) results significant, also when controlling for
P5-Grandiosity, this last symptom can not be considered the
principal mediator of the relation of interest. The inclusion of
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Correlation plot of the relation between interoceptive accuracy and PANSS Positive Symptoms Scale score for SCZ participants. (B) Correlation plot
of the relation between interoceptive accuracy and PANSS Negative Symptoms Scale score for SCZ participants. ∗ = Bonferroni corrected p < 0.025.
FIGURE 3 | Correlation plot of the relation between interoceptive
accuracy and P5-Grandiosity positive symptom for SCZ participants.
∗p value near to the Bonferroni corrected threshold (p < 0.007).
P5-Grandiosity as control variable in this last analysis conducted
on the score of Positive PANSS scale obtained by the sum
of all items with the exclusion of P5 is necessary to avoid
the possible influence of this specific symptom on the other
positive symptoms scored in the PANSS positive symptoms
scale.
Pearsons’ partial correlation analysis did not show a
significant linear relation between interoceptive accuracy and
SCZ participants’ score at Positive PANSS scale obtained by
the sum of the six items with the exclusion of P5-Grandiosity,
when controlling for P5-Grandiosity (r20 = 0.132; p = 0.559).
Taken together, these analyses suggested a mediator role
of P5-Grandiosity in the relation between SCZ participants’
interoceptive accuracy and positive symptoms.
DISCUSSION
The present study focused on the basic experience of the self
in schizophrenia, more specifically, on a not yet investigated
aspect, which is interoceptive accuracy. Starting from the
assumption that the effective detection and attribution of
inner bodily sensations to oneself requires an intact basic
sense of self, the aim of the present study was to explore
the individual sensitivity to physiological stimuli originating
inside of the body in a group of schizophrenia patients,
compared to healthy controls. Furthermore, on the basis of the
extended literature connecting altered basic self experiences, such
as body ownership and sense of agency, with schizophrenia
symptomatology, we also explored possible associations between
interoceptive accuracy and positive or negative schizophrenia
symptoms.
As expected, results demonstrated significantly lower
interoceptive accuracy in schizophrenia patients when compared
to healthy controls. This significant difference was not explained
by participants’ age, BMI, anxiety levels or HR. Furthermore,
patients’ illness severity, attention and pharmacological
treatment did not affect their interoceptive accuracy. It is
important to note that patients’ attention was assessed by means
of the score obtained at the corresponding item in the PANSS
(G11 score of PANSS) instead of formal neuropsychological
assessment. Future and more focused studies employing a direct
evaluation of patients’ attentive abilities are required to totally
exclude a possible interfering role of attention on patients’
interoceptive accuracy.
These results show, for the first time, that schizophrenia
patients have a reduced sensitivity to their inner bodily signals.
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TABLE 2 | Pearsons’ correlation coefficients (r) and p values (two-tailed) calculated between SCZ participants’ interoceptive accuracy and each item of
the PANSS Positive Scale.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
Interoceptive Accuracy r 0.437 0.378 0.238 0.410 0.531 0.095 0.384
p (two-tailed) 0.037 0.075 0.274 0.052 0.009∗ 0.667 0.070
N. 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
∗p value near to the Bonferroni corrected threshold (p < 0.007).
This suggests that, besides a feeble body ownership and an
iper/ipo-trophic sense of agency, the basic experience of the self,
as a body self, in schizophrenia is also characterized by damaged
interoceptive accuracy.
Hence, the negative relationship between the malleability
of the basic self and the interoceptive accuracy, previously
evidenced in healthy participants (Tsakiris et al., 2011; Tajadura-
Jiménez et al., 2012; Suzuki et al., 2013), seems to be preserved in
schizophrenia patients, where both body ownership (Peled et al.,
2000, 2003; Thakkar et al., 2011) and interoceptive accuracy are
altered.
Furthermore, considering coenaesthesic symptoms in
schizophrenia, described as unusual bodily and visceral
sensations (Parnas et al., 2005b; Vollmer-Larsen et al., 2007), the
reduced interoception in schizophrenia patients could constitute
a previously neglected feature possibly involved in these clinical
manifestations.
Several studies have shown that interoception is altered
in different psychiatric disorders. Among others, low
interoceptive accuracy was established in anorexia nervosa
(Pollatos et al., 2008; Gaudio et al., 2014), major depression
(Furman et al., 2013; Harshaw, 2015) and depersonalization-
derealization disorders (Sedeño et al., 2014). In a different way,
interoceptive accuracy was found abnormally higher among
people suffering from anxiety disorders than healthy controls
(Pollatos et al., 2009; Domschke et al., 2010). Frequently,
deficit in interoceptive accuracy has been associated to
anatomo-functional alterations of the Insular cortex (see
for example, Frank, 2015; Kerr et al., 2015) and to clinical
severity (Dunn et al., 2010b; Avery et al., 2014; Forrest
et al., 2015; Yoris et al., 2015). In general, the fact that
interoception is altered in several psychiatric diseases,
suggests an unspecific interaction between mental illnesses
and interoceptive accuracy. In the present study, however,
we found no general effects of illness severity on patients’
interoceptive accuracy. Rather, there was a linear relation
between interoceptive accuracy and only positive symptoms
suggesting a specific association between interoceptive abilities
and illness qualities of schizophrenia. This specific association
was mainly explained by the greater impact of Grandiosity
(P5 score of PANSS), with respect to other positive symptoms.
Grandiosity positive symptom refers to an “exaggerated self-
opinion and unrealistic convictions of superiority, including
delusions of extraordinary abilities, wealth, knowledge, fame,
power, and moral righteousness”.
A link between interoception and overstated explicit self
representation has been established in a large sample of healthy
controls (Lyons and Hughes, 2015). The authors demonstrated a
positive relation between narcissistic traits and awareness of inner
body sensations assessed through a formal questionnaire. In a
similar vein, when healthy participants were asked to concentrate
on their own mirror image (Ainley et al., 2012), the presentation
of self-related words or photograph of themselves (Ainley et al.,
2013) increased their interoceptive accuracy.
Overall, it seems that high self-opinion or focused attention on
explicit aspects of the self are associated to increased sensitivity
to the internal signals of the body. Drawing from this evidence,
we speculated that while interoception might contribute to
boost the explicit self representation in healthy controls, it
might contribute to a pathologically hyperbolic explicit self
representation in schizophrenia patients, characterized by a
distorted sense of self. Grandiosity and grandiose delusions
among schizophrenia patients, as well as narcissism traits
in healthy participants, are indeed frequently described as
defensive compensations against failures, dissatisfactions with
life and traumatic events (Knowles et al., 2011; Lyons and
Hughes, 2015). From this point of view, grandiosity and
grandiose delusions might be protective also against the altered
basic sense of self characterizing schizophrenia patients with
higher sensibility to inner bodily sensations. The loss of “the
circumference centre” might find its compensation by artificially
building an explicit over-extended self, particularly among
patients who are more in tune with their own internal bodily
signals.
In sum, the present results suggest that even if interoceptive
accuracy is altered in different psychiatric disorders, in the case of
schizophrenia it has a specific association with the clinical profile
of patients.
The present work specifically focuses on interoceptive
accuracy (i.e., objective performance at behavioral task
requiring the detection of visceral sensations), conceived
as the most basic dimension of interoception underlying
both interoceptive sensibility (i.e., explicit self-assessment
of subjective interoception abilities by questionnaires) and
interoceptive awareness (i.e., metacognitive awareness obtained
by confidence-accuracy correspondence) (Garfinkel and
Critchley, 2013; Garfinkel et al., 2014). The three interoceptive
dimensions, however, were found to correlate only in people
with high interoceptive accuracy (Garfinkel et al., 2014). Thus,
despite the fundamental qualification of interoceptive accuracy,
conclusions on this dimension cannot be generalized to the
other two. Specifically, the fact that schizophrenia patients show
lower interoceptive accuracy does not necessarily mean that they
also would show low interoceptive sensibility. For example, the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 July 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 379
fnhum-10-00379 July 25, 2016 Time: 11:54 # 8
Ardizzi et al. The Grandiose Inner Self
Hyperreflexivity tendency, considered one of the complementary
aspects of ipseity disorder (Sass and Parnas, 2003), predictive
of schizophrenia symptomatology (Sass and Parnas, 2003,
2007; Sass et al., 2013), may be conceptually closer to
interoceptive sensibility than to interoceptive accuracy.
Hyperreflexivity refers to an exaggerated self-consciousness, a
fundamentally non-volitional tendency for focal, objectifying
attention directed toward processes and phenomena that
would normally be “inhabited” or experienced as part of
oneself. In schizophrenia this exaggerated self-reflection
becomes automatic, leading to the popping-out of irrelevant
background stimuli (Sass and Parnas, 2003, 2007; Sass
et al., 2013). As a consequence, it may also result in an
exaggerated interoceptive sensibility. Differently, metacognitive
deficits, extensively established in schizophrenia (Gumley,
2011; Lysaker et al., 2014) also at the neural level (van der
Meer et al., 2010), may be conceptually closer to altered
interoceptive awareness, which is indeed defined as the
metacognitive awareness of interoceptive accuracy. Further
controlled studies are warranted to better clarify possible deficits
of the different interoceptive dimensions in schizophrenia,
as well as their specific association with different basic
experiences of the self. For example, besides low body
ownership and altered sense of agency, recent empirical
evidence demonstrated that first-episode schizophrenia patients
show an absence of the non-conceptual and pre-reflective
experience of self underpinned by sensorimotor processes
(Ferri et al., 2012). The relations between such processes
and interoceptive dimensions have not been investigated
yet, neither in healthy individuals nor in schizophrenia
patients.
Finally, the here reported direct association between high
interoceptive accuracy and positive symptoms can be more
deepened by the additional involvement of larger clinical
sample and by the formal assessment of patients’ subjective self
experiences through specific instruments (e.g., Examination of
Anomalous Self Experience; Parnas et al., 2005a). This effort,
adding operational depth to blur concepts, may also overcome
critics (see for example, Mishara, 2007) frequently raised to
schizophrenia phenomenological models.
CONCLUSION
The first time we investigated interoceptive accuracy in
schizophrenia, shedding light on a new and not yet investigated
aspect of basic self experiences. Schizophrenia patients showed
a severe loss of the ability to detect internal bodily signals
and to attribute them to themselves. Furthermore, interoceptive
accuracy was associated to patients’ positive symptomatology,
likely fostering a grandiose, and probably defensive, self-
opinion.
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